What we find interesting is not the margin compression itself. Every analyst sees the margin compression. Earnings models have it. Consensus estimates reflect it. Sell-side coverage has been tracking EV program losses since Ford created the segment disclosure in 2023.
What we find interesting is the gap between what was said on calls and what was filed. And more specifically, the fact that this gap is structural: it repeats every quarter, across every company, in the same direction. The calls are optimistic. The filings are not. And the filings are the legal record.
Of the seven OEMs we reviewed, six disclosed deteriorating margins or EV losses in annual filings during years where their earnings calls described the transition as on track, margins as sustainable, or pricing decisions as made from a position of strength.
Tesla is the most interesting case in the dataset because it is the only pure play EV company. There is no combustion business to subsidize losses. When Tesla's automotive gross margin fell from 28.5% in FY2022 to 17.8% in FY2025, that decline has nowhere to hide inside a larger segment. It is the whole company. The Q4 2022 earnings call, the one where management described having "significant pricing power," was followed by three years of price cuts and three years of margin compression. Both things are in the public record. What is interesting is that the record is so clear, and yet the call language so consistently pointed the other direction.
The transparency gap between Ford, Tesla, and everyone else is the second finding. Ford and Tesla both provide enough data for an outside observer to calculate unit economics. The rest of the group does not. That asymmetry is worth noting. It does not tell us whose numbers are better. It tells us whose statements are verifiable.
We are watching this closely. The 2025 annual filing cycle will show whether the structural cost problem is improving, holding, or widening. The answer will not come from earnings calls.